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Twenty years of the WTO Appellate Body’s ‘fragmentation jurisprudence’ 
 
 
The World Trade Organisation’s new dispute settlement machinery was one of a number of 
new international courts and tribunals established during the long decade between the end of 
the Cold War and the beginning of the new millennium. For international lawyers – long 
accustomed to life on the margins – the proliferation of new and vibrant specialised regimes 
of international law was both energising and anxiety producing. At the heart of the anxiety, as 
Koskenniemi and Leino have described,
1
 was a concern about the incoherence of 
international law, famously leading at the end of the 1990s to a debate amongst international 
lawyers about the dangers of the growing normative incoherence of the system. What would 
happened when two international tribunals sought to apply inconsistent rules to the same 
dispute? Could one tribunal legitimately consider rules of law which fell outside its 
specialised mandate, so as to reduce the chance of conflict? Given its position as one of the 
most significant, and certainly the most active, of this new generation of international 
tribunals, the WTO’s Appellate Body has been closely scrutinised for the approach it has 
taken in cases which appear to raise questions about the relationship between WTO law and 
so-called ‘non-WTO law’, and a range of views have emerged within WTO scholarship about 
what the appropriate role that the WTO should play in this respect.  
This contribution reflects on the first 20 years of the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence, 
specifically as it relates to questions of normative fragmentation. The first section provides an 
overview of some of the highlights of the WTO’s jurisprudence in this regard, focussing in 
particular on the often-discussed issue of the use which has been made of general public 
international law in the context of WTO dispute settlement. The second section then suggests 
that the primary driver of the Appellate Body’s approach so far has not been the institutional 
myopia and normative closure of which they are sometimes accused, but rather a judicial 
sensibility which valorises the virtues of  modesty, caution and self-restraint. In the third 
section, I offer a related argument, having to do with the causes of fragmentation. It is 
typically said that the problem of fragmentation arises from the specialised mandates of many 
international legal regimes, and the lack of institutionalised coordination between them. I 
note, however, that in fact the mandates, boundaries and specialisms of these regimes are not 
fixed in advance, but are in part the product of ongoing boundary work – and that the 
‘fragmentation’ jurisprudence of the Appellate Body has predictably involved boundary work 
of a particularly intense kind.  
 
1. An overview of the jurisprudence so far 
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 2 
In this section, my aim is to provide a brief overview of how the Appellate Body has 
considered ‘non-WTO’ law in its decisions, and has shown itself to be open to normative 
influences from outside the four corners of WTO law  in its jurisprudence.  
It is useful, as most commentators do, to begin by separating the question of applicable law 
from that of interpretation. As to the first question – the nature of the law applicable in WTO 
disputes – it is clear that the Appellate Body has adopted a relatively restrictive attitude. 
Although the Dispute Settlement Understanding does provide certain strong indications, 
particularly in Article 3.2, 7 and 11 that the applicable law is limited to WTO covered 
agreements, it does contain certain important ambiguities on this point,
2
 but the Appellate 
Body has shown itself to be consistently reluctant to exploit them. In its first decision in the 
ongoing Hormones litigation, for example, it rejected the idea that the precautionary 
principle, even if it were accepted as an established principle of customary international law, 
could be used directly in WTO proceedings to modify the effect of the clear terms of the SPS 
Agreement, saying: ‘the precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear 
textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal principles 
of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement’.3 Then, in Mexico – 
Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body then famously rejected an argument from Mexico that the 
US ought to be prevented from using WTO dispute settlement ‘as a result of the United States 
having prevented Mexico, by an illegal act … from having recourse to the NAFTA dispute 
settlement mechanism’.4 Its grounds for rejecting that argument were made clear in the 
following passage: 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the legal principle reflected in the passage referred to 
by Mexico is applicable within the WTO dispute settlement system, we note that this 
would entail a determination whether the United States has acted consistently or 
inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations. We see no basis in the DSU for panels 
and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes.
5
 
While this statement probably went too far, confusing interpretation with adjudication,
6
 the 
point for present purposes is that it clearly illustrates a deep reluctance on the part of the 
Appellate Body to be drawn into expressing an opinion on the content and meaning of 
international legal texts other than the covered agreements.  
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The Appellate Body has also been slow to recognise a role for general principles of 
international law in WTO dispute settlement. For example, in the same case of Mexico – Soft 
Drinks, the Appellate Body refused to decide whether the ‘clean hands’ doctrine relied on by 
Mexico was indeed part of WTO law. This approach – of refusing to decide one way or 
another – was also used in EC – Sugar in relation to the place of the doctrine of estoppel in 
WTO law.
7
 Similarly, it has adopted a relatively restrictive approach to the general principle 
of good faith, noting that such principle only formally enters WTO law to the extent that it is 
incorporated through the texts of the covered agreements themselves, for example by the 
explicit references to ‘good faith’ in DSU Articles 3.7 and 3.10.8 
It is fair to say, then, that the Appellate Body has been less that fully open to the application 
of non-WTO law in WTO proceedings, whether direct or indirect. An important qualification, 
however, needs to be made in relation to the application of what we might call secondary 
rules of public international law, on questions relating to attribution, the law of 
countermeasures, customary rules relating to treaty interpretation, as well as customary rules 
on evidence, burden of proof and related matters. Here, the Appellate Body has adopted a 
very different approach, and in fact draws very heavily on materials and doctrines from 
outside WTO law.
9
 But, while I do not wish to minimise the general importance of this trend, 
nevertheless it is not particularly significant in the context of assessing the Appellate Body’s 
response to normative fragmentation. It is one thing to be attentive to, and aware of, the 
content and relevance of secondary rules of public international law. But it is quite a different 
matter directly to apply or even consider substantive norms taken from non-WTO law which 
may conflict with WTO obligations. If anything the Appellate Body’s openness on questions 
of secondary law serves only to highlight the very different, more cautious, approach taken to 
substantive law. 
So much, then, for the question of fragmentation. What about interpretation? How far has the 
Appellate Body shown itself to be willing to use non-WTO law as a guide to the 
interpretation of WTO treaty texts? In this respect, there have been a few more twists and 
turns in the Appellate Body’s approach over time, and it is harder to make clear 
generalisations. Nevertheless, even here it is certainly possible to discern an overall tendency 
towards cautious incrementalism.  
At the very beginning, it should be noted, the signs were pointing in the opposite direction. In 
its very first case, the Appellate Body famously noted that Article 3.2 of the DSU ‘reflects a 
measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from 
public international law’.10 While this statement had relatively little formal legal significance, 
given that Article 3.2 refers only to the customary international legal rules relating to the 
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interpretation of treaties, it was nevertheless of considerable symbolic importance, and 
undoubtedly represented a crucial statement of intent. Then, two years later, in US – Shrimp, 
the Appellate Body appeared delivered on this promise, drawing on a quite breathtaking 
range of international legal material in its interpretation of ‘exhaustible natural resources’ 
under GATT Article XX(g), exactly in the manner one might expect of general public 
international law tribunal.
11
 But it became clear in retrospect that the true significance of US 
– Shrimp was more limited than it first appeared. It is one thing to interpret a term of art like 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ by looking at how the international community writ large uses 
that term in other international legal documents. It is quite another to take into account a 
potentially conflicting normative principle from non-WTO law to shape the interpretation of 
obligations in ambiguous WTO texts. In the former case, the stakes are considerably lower, 
and the nature of the enquiry is quite different. 
The significance of this distinction became very clear in the Panel decision in EC – Biotech. 
On one hand, the Panel in that case routinely turned to other international organisations for 
assistance in interpreting terms of art such as ‘pest’, ‘additive’ or ‘toxin’ in the SPS 
Agreement.
12
 Just like in US – Shrimp, this part of the decision appeared routine and 
uncontroversial. On the other hand, when asked to take into account the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which contained versions of the 
precautionary principle, the Panel changed track, and adopted a famously and controversially 
restrictive approach to the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, according to which that Article only requires ‘consideration of those rules of 
international law which are applicable in the relations between all parties to the treaty which 
is being interpreted’.13 This was a radically limiting move: as has often been pointed out, 
there are very few, if any, treaties to which all WTO Members are parties. The result of this 
interpretation, then would be to rob Article 31(3)(c) of much of its potential significance in 
opening the WTO system to normative influence from general international law.  
It is true that in the more recent case of EC – Aircraft, the Appellate Body signalled its 
willingness to depart from the Biotech panel’s approach in the certain circumstances. Still, its 
decision in this respect was cryptic and cautious, to say the least. On one hand, it noted that 
‘one must exercise caution in drawing from an international agreement to which not all WTO 
members are party’. At the same time, it cautiously suggested that a ‘delicate balance must be 
struck between, on the one hand, taking due account of an individual WTO Member’s 
international obligations and, on the other hand, ensuring a consistent and harmonious 
approach to the interpretation of WTO law among all WTO Members’.14 This is clearly an 
important statement of intent, signalling a re-opening of the door which the Biotech panel had 
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shut so firmly, even if the nature of the delicate balance remains entirely unspecified. Yet, 
even here, the decision is noteworthy for its extreme caution, and its decided unwillingness to 
set out its approach in bold statements. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in that same case 
the Appellate Body decided that, regardless of the way one interprets ‘the parties’ in Article 
31(3)(c), it did not need to refer to the agreement in question because the EC had not shown 
precisely how it was ‘relevant’ to the specific legal question at issue.15 This is another 
noteworthy feature of WTO jurisprudence on Article 31(3)(c): while some others have tended 
to downplay the legal significance of the term ‘relevant’ in Article 31(3)(c), the Appellate 
Body has treated it as a substantive requirement, requiring considerable effort to prove.
16
 The 
result, so far, has been that Article 31(3)(c) remains hardly used in WTO jurisprudence. 
What about other windows through which non-WTO law might be considered? Non-WTO 
treaties may for example be relevant to interpretation as ‘subsequent agreements’ under 
VCLT Article 31(3)(a) – or they may be considered in the course of analysing ‘subsequent 
practice’ under Article 31(3)(b). But in the WTO jurisprudence so far, such routes have been 
used only to draw on what we might call intra-WTO documents – that is to say, documents 
produced during WTO negotiations or in WTO committees, Ministerial Declarations, and so 
on – which are contained within the WTO covered agreements but still clearly part of the 
broader WTO acquis.
17
 Furthermore, attempts to get the Appellate Body to take into account 
non-WTO treaties as ‘international standards’ which Members are required to use under 
Article 2.4 of the TBT agreement have not fared much better. In Tuna II, it was made clear 
that, in order to qualify as an international standard, the treaty must be open to all WTO 
Members, in the sense that inclusion in the treaty is essentially automatic and non-
discretionary if a WTO Member expresses a desire to join.
18
 Again, there are few existing 
treaties for which this is clearly the case. And finally, the possibility of using VCLT Article 
41 as a window to consider inter se agreements has recently suffered an important blow, with 
the Appellate Body in Peru – Agricultural Products deciding that WTO Members have 




While there is much more which could be said, even from these limited highlights, a 
reasonably clear picture emerges of a very cautious Appellate Body, on the one hand clearly 
acknowledging its place within the wider system of international law, but on the other very 
reticent to take explicitly into account normative influences from other specialised regimes of 
international law. While it has shown itself willing to elaborate and apply secondary rules of 
international law, and interpret terms of art using material from other fields of expertise, in 
such cases the stakes are relatively low. Where the stakes are high, that is to say where there 
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are potential conflicts between WTO and non-WTO law, it has adopted a very different 
approach.  
2. Institutional myopia? 
The conclusion sometimes drawn from this picture is that the WTO dispute settlement system 
is relatively inward-looking, and closed off from the broader system of international law and 
the values which underpin it. In this section, I want to suggest that this conclusion is 
somewhat misleading. To characterise the WTO, or the Appellate Body, primarily in terms of 
degrees of ‘openness’ or ‘closure’ to external values and rules does not seem to me to capture 
the essential aspects of the institution, or the dynamics of its decision-making. 
The first and most simple point to make is that the Appellate Body’s general reluctance to 
make formal and explicit reference to non-WTO law is not quite the same thing as normative 
closure. For one thing, it is probably fair to say that (like all judicial institutions), the 
Appellate Body does take a great deal into account which does not formally enter the pages 
of its judgments. More importantly, the overall trajectory of the jurisprudence I have just 
described is only explicable once one acknowledges that the non-WTO law in question, is 
absolutely at the forefront of adjudicators’ minds. It is precisely because the Appellate Body 
is intensely aware of the reality of the fragmentation of international law, and very conscious 
of the high stakes of their decisions for other areas of international law, that it has as a 
consequence adopted a self-consciously cautious and non-confrontational style of decision-
making. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. After all, in cases which raise potential 
normative conflicts between WTO and non-WTO law, the Appellate Body finds itself in a 
difficult position, being asked to adjudicate cases involving fundamental values conflicts 
which are hardly amenable to judicial resolution, at least not without threatening the 
legitimacy of the tribunals to whom the task falls. 
What do I mean when I say that the Appellate Body has adopted a style of decision-making 
which attempts to defuse the stakes of inter-regime conflicts? The hallmarks of this style 
include actively seeking to avoid addressing the problem of normative conflicts, refusing to 
heirarchise different regimes of international law, rejecting anything which looks like an 
attempt to systematise or constitutionalise international law, and leaving controversial 
questions as open as possible, for as long as reasonable. At the level of technique, this is 
nothing more than the application of the methods which lawyers use everywhere to chart a 
careful path around sensitive normative or political questions, which appear at any given 
moment, and in any given context, to fall outside the boundaries of legal expertise. We find, 
for example, a heavy reliance on the specific configuration of facts in a number of the cases 
referred to earlier,
20
 which naturally reduces their systemic significance, and provides a 
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number of grounds for future tribunals to distinguish them. We also see relatively frequent 
recourse to arguendo reasoning, which helps to leave certain key legal questions 
unresolved.
21
 Other avoidance techniques include a decision not to complete the analysis,
22
 or 
limiting the frame of reasoning by hewing closely to the content of parties’ arguments.23 The 
Apellate Body also sometimes relies heavily on the limits of its expertise, or of its 
institutional mandate, to avoid questions which they may not feel they have the legitimacy to 
address.
24
 Furthermore, we see on occasion also the Appellate Body sidestepping systemic 
questions concerning the relation between WTO and non-WTO law, by recasting problems of 
fragmentation as internal questions of the interpretation of WTO texts.
25
  
Many years ago, Weiler famously wrote that WTO dispute settlement was hampered by the 
continuation of its ‘diplomatic ethos’, as it tried to re-invent itself in judicialised form.26 
There is I think a strong connection here with Weiler’s story. While I am not suggesting that 
the style of decision-making I am describing here represents the continuation of a diplomatic 
ethos in place of a lawyerly culture, nevertheless, it does seem possible that the particular 
judicial style of the AB, its particular understanding of the judicial function and of the place 
of dispute settlement in the overall institutional structure, is a lawyerly expression of that 
diplomatic ethos carried out through judicial techniques. It is very different from the 
approach to fragmentation that we see in other institutions – think for example of the 
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the German 
Constitutional Court – in which the imagined role of the judicature is an altogether more 
                                                                                                                                                        
Add.9 and Corr.1, adopted 21 November 2006. It is also worth mentioning the ongoing disputes over Australia’s 
plain packaging regulations, in which a large proportion of the argument is built around reams of factual 
evidence relating to the effects of different sorts of packaging on consumers, as well as the effects of the 
measure in question. 
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the extraterritoriality of measures under Article XX).  
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‘related’ in the definition of technical regulation. 
24
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WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 123, as well as Appellate Body Report, 
Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, para 
56. 
25
 Note, for example, the way in which the Appellate Body in the Hormones litigation refocussed the question of 
the status and relevance of the precautionary principle in WTO law into a question about the meaning of terms 
such as ‘sufficient’ in the SPS Agreement: Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 124. A more recent 
example is in Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS457/AB/R, adopted 31 July 2015, paras 5.112-5.113 in which the Appellate Body made clear that, in 
relation to the question of whether an RTA between WTO Members can derogate from WTO obligations, the 
controlling text is GATT Article XXIV, not VCLT Article 41. 
26
 Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats – Reflections on the Internal and External 
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2002) 13 American Rev Int'l Arbitration 177. 
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‘heroic’ one, standing firmly on behalf of fundamental norms, defining the basic 
commitments of a political body, or acting as the spokesperson for an imagined coherent 
legal order. It would not surprise me if this were one of the most enduring legacies of the 
Appellate Body’s work so far on questions of fragmentation – that is to say, the definition 
and performance of a particular style of judicial decision-making, which relies heavily on 
techniques of de-systematisation, issue avoidance and boundary-drawing, in service of its 
own valorised virtues of modesty, self-imposed narrowness, caution and incrementalism. 
3. The causes of fragmentation 
So far, I have said that the response of the WTO’s Appellate Body to cases involving 
fragmentation is more often driven by caution rather than the myopia of which it is 
sometimes accused. In this final section, let me now say something about the causes of 
fragmentation, and what this line of WTO cases may reveal about them. 
The most prevalent story of how normative fragmentation arises begins with the proliferation 
of specialised regimes of international law, from the end of the Cold War. Fragmentation, in 
this story, emerges primarily from a structural weakness of the decentralised international 
legal system – that is to say, the lack of any clear institutional mechanisms for ensuring 
coordination and coherence across these different specialised regimes. Since each regime 
focusses on its own mandate largely to the exclusion of consideration of the system as a 
whole, and since each regime pursues a different set of objectives and values, the potential 
for conflict between rules and regime at their margins is high.  
Importantly, this way of describing the problem of fragmentation predisposes us towards 
certain solutions. Since institutional myopia, and specialisation without coordination, seem to 
be at the root of the problem, then we can be led towards seeing the opposite – namely, 
institutional openness and mechanisms of formal coordination between regimes. Thus, the 
idea has taken root in many international legal circles that the international judiciary ought to 
act as an instrument of coherence and co-ordination, and to take responsibility for systemic 
integration through the aspiration towards a universal view. In light of the jurisprudence 
outlined above, the Appellate Body has often been criticised for failing to live up to this 
standard. 
In these remarks, I do not want to broach directly the difficult question of whether or not this 
is in fact an appropriate and desirable role for the Appellate Body, or indeed for the 
international judiciary more generally. But I do want to suggest that it is a built on a picture 
of the causes of fragmentation which are partial at best.  
An alternative account begins not with the structure of international law but with what we 
might think of a standard political struggles over domestic regulatory measures. 
Fragmentation, in this story, results in part as these regulatory disputes are projected 
internationally, and played out in international legal venues. Crucially, in this process of 
projection, such disputes take on a different character. While in the domestic context they are 
essentially about the rights and wrongs of the regulatory measure in question, in the 
international plane they come to be about much more. As rules from different fields of 
 9 
international law are deployed on both sides, and as each sides uses different international 
legal venues to further their argument, the issue become as much about the systemic 
fragmentation of international law as it is about the rights and wrongs of the original 
regulatory measure. Through this process, what starts out as a difficult and sensitive political 
controversy becomes even more difficult and sensitive, since its resolution now seems to 
implicate a broader hierarchy of values and objectives of the international community – or 
perhaps even the incremental constitutionalisation of international law.  
This, then, is the dynamic which in my view leads the Appellate Body to adopt the approach 
outlined above. Faced with a dispute in which the stakes appear to be impossibly large, its 
response is reduce the stakes, to delimit and narrow the parameters of the dispute so as to 
make it amenable to judicial resolution, without calling into question its own legitimacy. As 
described earlier, this involves considerable boundary work to achieve, for example by 
redescribing issues in ways which locate them outside their competence. If it is true that the 
boundaries, mandate and expertise of the WTO are in part the result of the way they are 
interpreted in venues such as dispute settlement, then this important. It means that the 
fragmentation of international law is in part the result of the projection into international law 
of standard regulatory struggles, and the operation of the cautious sensibility of the 
international adjudicator in dispute settlement processes, as they are about the structure of 
international law. Fragmentation, that is to say, is not just the result of flawed institutions, to 
which international lawyers must respond with projects of coherence, it is also in significant 
part the effect of the application of standard international legal techniques to internationalised 
regulatory disputes. 
In the short or even medium term, I would argue, it is hard to see this dynamic changing a 
great deal. The Appellate Body’s cautious approach is a response to the structural position in 
which it finds itself – asked to address sensitive questions which have proved too difficult for 
traditional political processes, but without the clear legitimacy needed to address them head 
on. There are many pressures pushing judicial tribunals in this position towards techniques of 
judicial avoidance and de-escalation. It is of course a separate question what the 
consequences of this approach will be, and what alternatives may exist. My point is simply 
that a clear eyed response to international legal fragmentation needs to start with a fuller 
understanding of the conditions in which it emerges as a problem.  
 
